adam zivo: the west’s dithering on ukraine is spurring nuclear proliferation
while north korea is suspected of asking russia for nuclear technology in return for its support, other countries eye nuclearization in self-defence
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russian president vladimir putin greets north korea's foreign minister, choe son hui, prior to talks in moscow on nov. 4, 2024. north korea is suspected of asking russia for nuclear technology in exchange for its support in the russia-ukraine war.
mikhail tereshchenko / pool / afp via getty images
north korea’s ongoing military support of russia — including the recent arrival of approximately 10,000 north korean troops near the ukrainian border — has raised the chilling question of what pyongyang has asked for in return for its aid. if, as suspected, that includes nuclear technology, the devastating reality will be that by showing weakness in ukraine, the west has encouraged nuclear proliferation. russia and china have always considered north korea to be a strategic military asset, yet, before the full-scale invasion of ukraine, both countries understandably saw pyongyang’s nuclear program as a threat to regional stability. as such, they collaborated with the west to constrain north korean nuclear capabilities where possible, and even supported multiple rounds of un sanctions that further crippled the rogue state.
while russia sometimes failed to adhere to these sanctions, its economic decoupling from north korea was nonetheless so severe that trade fell from a peak of $220 million in 2005 to just $3.8 million in 2022 — a reduction of 98 per cent.
but then the attack on ukraine changed everything. lacking allies and sufficient munitions, moscow turned to pyongyang for aid and found a willing and productive partner.
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after north korean leader kim jong un visited russia in late 2023, his regime began sending millions of artillery shells to the kremlin, which allowed russian troops to maintain a devastating edge on the front lines and to advance, slowly but persistently, into ukraine’s southeast. then, this june, russian president vladimir putin visited pyongyang for the first time since 2000 and signed an unprecedented defence treaty between the two nations, setting the stage for the transfer of thousands of north korean troops to the front lines this autumn.
it is unclear what, exactly, north korea is getting in return for its assistance, but security experts widely believe that, in addition to food and money, it will ask for military technology that could prove invaluable for its growing nuclear arsenal. putin has noticeably shifted his rhetoric around north korea: in lieu of condemning proliferation, he now emphasizes north korea’s right to self-defence.
while chinese officials are reportedly unhappy with this development, they apparently remain unsure of how to respond and have, at this point, avoided addressing the issue. other asian neighbours are alarmed, though.
south koreans are increasingly debating whether it would be wise to develop their own nuclear arsenal — or, if not that, then to develop their “nuclear latency” (the capacity to quickly go nuclear in the future). not only did the country’s new defence minister publicly declare in september that he would be open to nuclearization, a gallup korea poll released this february also showed that 72.8 per cent of south koreans favoured possessing nukes.
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this same shift is occurring in japan, where the country’s new prime minister recently called for the creation of a domestic nuclear arsenal. while the japanese have, for obvious reasons, traditionally opposed nuclear proliferation, new polls show that up to 80 per cent of respondents would be open to discussing having allied nukes hosted in their country.
by some estimates, it would take japan only a few months, and south korea only two or three years, to go nuclear. it seems this is a future we may have to contend with should the situation continue to deteriorate.
but none of this would have happened had the west provided more support to ukraine, rather than dithering and slow-dripping weapon deliveries — or, at the very least, the prospect of nuclearization would have been delayed.
in 2022, the ukrainians had, against all odds, seized the battleground initiative only to see their attacks stall amid weapons shortages. by the time more substantial support arrived the following year, belated and still insufficient, the russians had already reorganized and entrenched themselves. thus, instead of quick victory, we now have a protracted war of attrition that encourages deeper russo-north korean co-operation.
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some might argue that, rather than give kyiv more weapons, the solution would have been to abandon ukraine and force a peaceful surrender. these same people often argue for stopping weapons shipments today. yet their recommendations are fanciful and would only make nuclear proliferation worse.
the only reason south korea and japan have not sought nukes is because they feel secure under the protection of the united states’ nuclear umbrella. if ukraine were to be abandoned, why would the south koreans and japanese trust in american protection? arguments for nuclearization would, in this case, grow much stronger.
the same is true for several european countries.
frightened by russia’s aggression, poland has made tremendous military investments since 2022 and, earlier this year, expressed openness to hosting american nuclear weapons. should western alliances prove hollow, and should russia conquer ukraine and march to poland’s doorstep, it may be possible that the poles will nuclearize as well — especially if other countries, such as south korea, make the same move and set off a chain reaction.
european policy-makers are also already debating whether germany should develop its own nuclear deterrent, as the united states is increasingly seen as an unreliable guarantor of the continent’s safety.
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undoing nuclearization in any of these countries would be almost impossible. only two countries in history have voluntarily disposed of their nuclear arsenals: south africa and ukraine. the ukrainians gave up their nukes in 1994 in exchange for security guarantees from russia and the west, but, as we see today amid our inadequate support for kyiv, they were essentially scammed. unless the west fulfills its promises and protects ukrainian sovereignty, few others would want to make that same mistake.
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